St. John's Law Review
Volume 51, Spring 1977, Number 3

Article 12

Penal Law § 135.20: Court of Appeals Reaffirms Merger Doctrine
in Second Degree Kidnapping Prosecutions
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

1977l

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

Clearly, the Agioritis decision is in accord with this legislative purpose. The determination that a post-August 31, 1966 change in depository or beneficiary converts the account into a testamentary substitute, as well as the application of the first in - first out rule to
withdrawals, serves to reduce the amount of property exempt from
the right of election.' Thus, by basing its decision on a literal
construction of the statute rather than an analysis of whether the
change in the Totten trust was one of form or substance, the
Agioritis Court was faithful to the legislatively declared policy underlying the statute.
PENAL LAW

Penal Law § 135.20: Court of Appeals redffirms merger doctrine in

second degree kidnapping prosecutions.
Formulated by the judiciary to mitigate the unjust consequences of the overly broad definition of kidnapping contained in
the former New York Penal Code,' the merger doctrine mandates
COMM'N ON THE MODERNIZATION, REVISION AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE LAW OF ESTATES, THIRD

REPORT, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 19, at 117-18 (1964) [hereinafter cited as COMM'N ON ESTATES].
See generally 9A RoHN, supra note 122, 5-1.1[4]; Amend, The Surviving Spouse and the
Estates,Powers and Trust Law, 33 BROOKLYN L. REv. 530 (1967); Arenson, Surviving Spouse's
Right of Election, 25 N.Y. CouNTY L. B. BuLL. 53 (1967-1968). Admitting that criticism of §
18's failure to protect a surviving spouse's right of election was well-founded, the Commission
stated that "if any inter vivos device appears to be testamentary, it is the Totten trust ....
[U]ntil the Halpern case came along, it was popularly and not unreasonably understoodthat
a Totten trust was illusory per se." COMM'N ON ESTATES, supra at 124. The Commission
concluded that a surviving spouse could not be protected until the Halpern decision was
overcome. Id. These statements by the Commission demonstrate that in adopting the recommended § 5-1.1(b) the legislature intended to protect the surviving spouse from disinheritance
through the mechanism of a Totten trust.
10 With respect to the first in - first out rule, Professor Patrick J. Rohan has observed:
If a "last in - first out" rule is applied, this will tend to perpetuate the exemption
accorded funds deposited prior to the effective date of the statute. If a "first in first out rule" is applied, this rule will serve to wither away the exemption of
previously deposited funds, and thereby implement the beneficial ends sought to
be achieved by EPTL 5-1.1(b) ....
9A ROHAN, supra note 122, 5-1.1[5] at 5-51. Under the first in - first out method withdrawals made both prior and subsequent to August 31, 1966 will be regarded as having been made
from funds deposited first, thereby decreasing the proportion of exempt funds in the balance
of the account. This method of accounting also is utilized in the area of bank deposits and
collections. See N.Y.U.C.C. § 4-208(2) (McKinney 1964).
I Ch. 321, § 3, [1965] N.Y. Laws 1022-23 (repealed by ch. 1030, § 500, [1965] N.Y.
Laws 2482 (effective 1967)). The statute provided that:
A person who wilfully: 1. Seizes, confines, inveigles, or kidnaps another, with intent
to cause him, without authority of law, to be confined or imprisoned within this
state, or to be sent out of the state, or to be sold as a slave, or in any way held to
service or kept or detained, against his will...
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that a kidnapping charge be merged with another charged crime
when the kidnapping is based on acts integral to the commission of
the other crime.1 2 Since the emergence of the merger doctrine, however, the legislature has extensively revised the Penal Law, substantially altering the kidnapping provisions.' As a result of this legislative action, it has been uncertain whether the courts would continue
to apply the doctrine.
Recently, the Court of Appeals, in People v. Cassidy,' held
that the merger doctrine has survived the revision of the Penal Law
with respect to the crime of kidnapping in the second degree.' 45 In

[i]s guilty of kidnapping ....
Id. (emphasis added). See generally Finley, The Lindbergh Law, 28 GEO. L.J. 908 (1940);
Fisher & McGuire, Kidnapping and the So-Called Lindbergh Law, 12 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 646
(1935).
M The merger doctrine was formulated in two prerevision cases, People v. Lombardi, 20
N.Y.2d 266, 229 N.E.2d 206, 282 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1967), discussed in 42 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 604
(1968), and People v. Levy, 15 N.Y.2d 159, 204 N.E.2d 842, 256 N.Y.S.2d 793, cert. denied,
381 U.S. 938 (1965), in an attempt "to limit the application of the kidnapping statute to
'kidnapping' in the conventional sense in which that term has now come to have acquired
meaning." Id. at 164-65, 204 N.E.2d at 844, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 796. The former statute enabled
a prosecutor to charge kidnapping in every crime, such as robbery or rape, where the victim
was "kept or detained, against his will." Ch. 321, § 3, [1965] N.Y. Laws 1022, 1023 (repealed
by ch. 1030, § 500, [1965] N.Y. Laws 2482 (effective 1967)), quoted in note 141 supra. An
aversion to this practice arose since it made possible the imposition of a serious felony penalty
upon conduct which was in fact a lesser felony or a misdemeanor. The Levy-Lombardi rule,
therefore, was developed to merge the detention or asportation of the victim with the other
criminal conduct, resulting in the defendant being convicted of only the lesser offense. The
Levy-Lombardi doctrine has since been applied in numerous criminal prosecutions. See, e.g.,
People v. Watt, 48 App. Div. 2d 863, 368 N.Y.S.2d 582 (2d Dep't 1975) (mem.); People v.
King, 26 App. Div. 2d 832, 273 N.Y.S.2d 925 (2d Dep't 1966) (mem.); People v. Hatch, 25
App. Div. 2d 606, 267 N.Y.S.2d 651 (4th Dep't 1966) (mee.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 923
(1967). See also People v. Webster, 54 App. Div. 2d 703, 387 N.Y.S.2d 443 (2d Dep't 1976)
(mem.); People v. Ennis, 50 App. Div. 2d 935, 377 N.Y.S.2d 600 (2d Dep't 1975) (mem.).
'1
See ch. 1030, § 500, [1965] N.Y. Laws 2482 (effective 1967) (repealing ch. 321, § 3,
[1965] N.Y. Laws 1022). The revision materially redefined kidnapping by dividing it into
two degrees and adding two lesser related offenses. These four provisions currently are:
unlawful imprisonment in the second degree, a class A misdemeanor; unlawful imprisonment
in the first degree, a class E felony; kidnapping in the second degree, a class B felony; and
kidnapping in the first degree, a class A-1 felony. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § § 135.00-.25 (McKinney 1975).
40 N.Y.2d 763, 358 N.E.2d 870, 390 N.Y.S.2d 45 (1976), aff'g 50 App. Div. 2d 803, 375
N.Y.S.2d 403 (2d Dep't) (mee.), aff'g in partand rev'g in part 80 Misc. 2d 713, 363 N.Y.S.2d
788 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1975) (mei.).
'- 40 N.Y.2d at 765, 358 N.E.2d at 872, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 47. Consolidated in the appeal
with Cassidy were People v. Dolan, 51 App. Div. 2d 589, 379 N.Y.S.2d 375 (2d Dep't 1976)
(mem.) and People v. Usher, 49 App. Div. 2d 499, 375 N.Y.S.2d 881 (2d Dep't 1975). In both
of these cases the Court of Appeals affirmed the second department's application of the
merger doctrine to a conviction of kidnapping in the second degree.

1977]

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

Cassidy, defendant had seized the victim as she was walking home
from school, and dragged her at knifepoint approximately 70 feet
into a dark and deserted garage.'48 Defendant then threatened her,
cut her with the knife, ordered her to undress, and tore her clothing,
at which point she lost consciousness. 4 ' Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of kidnapping in the second degree, assault
in the second degree, and attempted sexual abuse in the first degree.
The Appellate Division, Second Department, modified this judgment by reversing the kidnapping conviction."'
Judge Jones, writing for a unanimous Court, affirmed the appellate division, holding that the charge of kidnapping in the second
degree had merged with the other charged crimes.'49 In reaching this
result, the Cassidy Court rejected the district attorney's contention
that the legislature, by enacting a 12-hour durational requirement
for first degree kidnapping,' 0 had manifested an intent to free prosecutions for kidnapping in the second degree "from the constraints
of the former merger doctrine.''5 While conceding that the requisite

12-hour time period for kidnapping in the first degree rendered the
application of the merger doctrine unnecessary in prosecutions
under that specific section, 5 1 Judge Jones declared that "[w]e find
nothing in the legislative history nor in reason which compels the
conclusion that . . . the Legislature [intended] to write off the
Id. at 767, 358 N.E.2d at 873, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 48.
Brief for Respondent-Appellant at 4, People v. Cassidy, 40 N.Y.2d 763, 358 N.E.2d
870, 390 N.Y.S.2d 45 (1976). Two hours after the victim lost consciousness she was revived
by the owner of the garage. Id.
its 50 App. Div. 2d 803, 375 N.Y.S.2d 403.
,' 40 N.Y.2d at 768, 358 N.E.2d at 873-74, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 48.
" N.Y. PENAL LAw § 135.25 (McKinney 1975) provides in pertinent part:
A person is guilty of kidnapping in the first degree when he abducts another person
and when:
848
"

2. He restrains the person abducted for a period of more than twelve
hours with intent to:
(a) Inflict physical injury upon him or violate him sexually; or
(b) Accomplish or advance the commission of a felony ....
Id. (emphasis added).
"' 40 N.Y.2d at 766, 358 N.E.2d at 872, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 47. In essence, the district
attorney argued that the addition of a durational requirement to the first degree kidnapping
statute constituted the entire legislative solution to the problems engendered by the former
kidnapping statute. Therefore, the state maintained, the legislature has evinced an intent
that prosecutions of kidnapping in the second degree be unencumbered by the judiciallycreated merger doctrine. Id.
,"I Id. First degree kidnapping can be established under any one of three distinct theories,
see N.Y. PENAL LAw § 135.25 (McKinney 1975), only one of which contains a durational
requirement. See id. § 135.25(2).
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merger doctrine entirely or to eliminate it with respect to prosecutions for kidnapping in the second degree ... ."I" Having found
no legislative intent to preclude the application of the merger doctrine to kidnapping in the second degree,'54 the Court of Appeals
then considered the question whether the doctrine was applicable
in Cassidy. Finding that the detention of the victim had been incidental to the commission of the two other crimes, Judge Jones concluded that the kidnapping charge had merged with them.'
The application of the merger doctrine in Cassidy appears proper. The doctrine was designed to preclude convictions under an
overbroad kidnapping statute in situations where the kidnapping
was merely incidental to another crime.' 5 Although the overhaul of
the kidnapping statute apparently was intended to narrow the definition of that crime, ' offenses which involve only incidental abductions still can be characterized as kidnapping in the second de' To
gree. 58
ensure that criminal responsibility for kidnapping is not
"3 40 N.Y.2d at 766, 358 N.E.2d at 872, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 47.
"I The Court did note that an exception to the merger doctrine is made where the

"'means used in committing another crime'" are such that they shock one's conscience.
In
these exceptional situations, the abduction is to be treated as a "'separately cognizable
offense.'" 40 N.Y.2d at 767, 358 N.E.2d at 873, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 48, quoting People v. Miles,
23 N.Y.2d 527, 539, 245 N.E.2d 688, 694, 297 N.Y.S.2d 913, 922, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 948
(1969).
It is interesting to note that an appellate court has the power to modify a conviction by
reducing it to a lesser included offense. This power may be exercised upon a finding that the
evidence is insufficient to establish defendant's guilt of the crime of which he was convicted,
but sufficient to support a conviction of the lesser included offense. CPL 470.15(2)(a). In
Cassidy, the appellate division did not exercise this power. See 50 App. Div. 2d at 803, 375
N.Y.S.2d at 403.
" Three factors which the Court deemed pertinent to an application of the merger
doctrine are whether the crime appeared to be merely a rape or robbery, whether the abduction was relatively brief, and whether the entire enterprise had a "genuine 'kidnapping'
flavor." 40 N.Y.2d at 765-66, 358 N.E.2d at 872, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 47, citing N.Y. PENAL LAw
§ 135.25, commentary at 502 (McKinney 1975).
" See, e.g., People v. Levy, 15 N.Y.2d 159, 204 N.E.2d 842, 256 N.Y.S.2d 793, cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 938 (1965); note 142 supra.
"I See N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 135.00-.25 (McKinney 1975).
's See, e.g., People v. Ennis, 50 App. Div. 2d 935, 377 N.Y.S.2d 600 (2d Dep't 1975).
The N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.20 (McKinney 1975) provides that "[a] person is guilty of
kidnapping in the second degree when he abducts another person." An abduction is a restraint of "a person with intent to prevent his liberation by either (a) secreting or holding
him in a place where he is not likely to be found, or (b) using or threatening to use deadly
physical force." Id. § 135.00(2). Finally, a restraint is an intentional restriction of a person's
movements which interferes "substantially with his liberty. . . ...
Id. § 135.00(1). A careful
reading of these definitions reveals the breadth of the second degree kidnapping statute. See
42 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 604, 608-09 (1968). That the statute is capable of being applied to
offenses involving only incidental abductions is demonstrated by the Cassidy fact pattern.
See notes 146-48 and accompanying text supra.
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attributed to conduct which is actually an integral part of another
offense, it was necessary that kidnapping in the second degree be
merged with rape and robbery.
It is submitted, however, that the merger doctrine need be extended no further to accomplish its objectives. Thus, the two lesser
related offenses created by the revision of the kidnapping statute,
unlawful imprisonment in the first and second degrees, "9 should not
be merged with robbery and rape. Because these two crimes are less
serious than rape and robbery, their existence does not create the
difficulty that led to the formulation of the merger doctrine: 6 they
cannot be used to elevate the charges against a person who has in
fact committed a lesser crime. Perhaps in recognition of this fact,
several lower court decisions have refused to merge unlawful imprisonment with rape and robbery."5 ' Unfortunately, the Cassidy Court
was not presented with this issue. It is hoped that in the near future
the Court of Appeals will have an opportunity to confront the problem.
SURROGATE'S COURT PROCEDURE

ACT

Jurisdictionof surrogate's court over inter vivos trusts relating to
the affairs of a decedent.
Both the New York State Constitution' and the Surrogate's
Court Procedure Act' bestow upon the surrogate's court jurisdiction over all actions, proceedings, and matters "relating to the af','N.Y.

PENAL LAw §§ 135.05-.10 (McKinney 1975).
See note 142 and accompanying text supra.
See People v. Webster, 54 App. Div. 2d 703, 387 N.Y.S.2d 443 (2d Dep't 1976) (mem.)
(unlawful imprisonment in the first degree does not merge with rape and robbery); People v.
Ennis, 50 App. Div. 2d 935, 377 N.Y.S.2d 600 (2d Dep't 1975) (mem.) (unlawful imprisonment
in the first degree does not merge with attempted rape).
162N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 12(d) provides:
The surrogate's court shall have jurisdiction over all actions and proceedings relating to the affairs of decedents, probate of wills, administration of estates and actions and proceedings arising thereunder or pertaining thereto, guardianship of the
property of minors, and such other actions and proceedings, not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the supreme court, as may be provided by law.
" N.Y. SuRR. CT. PRoc. Acr § 201(3) (McKinney 1967) provides:
The court shall continue to exercise full and complete general jurisdiction in law
and in equity to administer justice in all matters relating to the affairs of decedents,
and upon the return of any process to try and determine all questions, legal or
equitable, arising between any or all of the parties to any action or proceeding, or
between any party and any other person having any claim or interest therein, over
whom jurisdiction has been obtained as to any and all matters necessary to be
determined in order to make a full, equitable and complete disposition of the
matter by such order or decree as justice requires.
"6
"

